Constitutional Law - Search and Seizure - Wife\u27s Consent to Search and Seizure of Husband\u27s Property Held Not Sufficient to Waive Constitutional Rights Protecting Husband. State v. Hall, 142 S.E.2d 177 (1965). by Kraftson, R. H.
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 7 | Issue 1 Article 16
Constitutional Law - Search and Seizure - Wife's
Consent to Search and Seizure of Husband's
Property Held Not Sufficient to Waive
Constitutional Rights Protecting Husband. State v.
Hall, 142 S.E.2d 177 (1965).
R. H. Kraftson
Copyright c 1966 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
R. H. Kraftson, Constitutional Law - Search and Seizure - Wife's Consent to Search and Seizure of
Husband's Property Held Not Sufficient to Waive Constitutional Rights Protecting Husband. State v. Hall,
142 S.E.2d 177 (1965)., 7 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 195 (1966), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/
vol7/iss1/16
CURRENT DECISIONS
Constitutional Law-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-WIFE'S CONSENT TO
SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF HUSBAND'S PROPERTY HELD NOT SUFFICIENT TO
WAIVE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS PROTECTING HUSBAND. Appellant was
convicted in a North Carolina court of store breaking and larceny. While
appellant was being held in jail on a previous charge, two law enforce-
ment officers searched appellant's home with the consent of his wife.
Stolen articles were found which came from the scene of the crime.
When confronted with these items, the defendant voluntarily confessed
and directed the officers to a place where a stolen truck was hidden. The
North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that
the husband's constitutional right to be secure against unlawful search
and seizure could not be waived by his wife. The court further held
that the stolen items were improperly admitted into evidence since
they were unlawfully obtained.'
In passing for the first time on the right of a wife to consent to a
search of the husband's dwelling, this court reversed the trial court's
decision on the following two main points.
The first, and most important, argument is that the wife's consent,
even though uncoerced, is not sufficient to waive the absent husband's
constitutional right to be secure in his home. This doctrine is not
new in the federal courts. They have held that the burden of proving
the agency of the wife was on the government, and furthermore "that
she has no implied authority, in the absence of her husband, to license
a search of the premises." 3 A few other states are in accord. 4
An additional argument used by the court in reinforcing its main
point was that of implied coercion. Amos v. United States is cited as
one of the earliest federal cases holding that the mere presence of armed
law enforcement officers may be deemed coercion when permission to
search is requested. Other federal decisions have also relied upon this
1. State v. Hall, 142 SXE2d 177, at 179 (N.C. 1965), "The wife's consent to the search
was not sufficient to waive the husband's right to be 'Secure.... against unlawful search
and seizures"'
2. Ibid.
3. United States v. Rykowskl, 267 Fed. 866 at 871 (S.D. Ohio 1920), a similar case.
In Cofer v. United States, 37 F.2d 677, 679 (5th Cir. 1930), "The wife was without
authority to bind her absent husband by waiving a legal warrant, or consenting to an
unauthorized search."
4. Humes v. Taber, 1 RI. 464 (1850), seems to be the first American decision on this
point; Sheftall v. Zipperer, 133 Ga. 488, 66 S.E. 253 (1909); State v. Evans, 45 Hawaii
622, 372 P.2d 365 (1965); Dalton v. State', 230 Ind. 626, 105 N.E.2d 509 (1952); Veal v.
Commonwealth, 199 Ky. 634, 251 S.W. 648 (1923); Henry v. State, 154 So.2d 289,
(Miss. 1963); Simmons v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 18, 229 P.2d 615 (1951) concur.
5. 255 US. 313, 41 S. Ct. 266 (1920).
1966]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
rationale when invalidating searches and seizures. 6 Some state courts
which have not used the wife's inability to waive the husband's rights
to keep out illegally seized evidence, do reach the same result by relying
on the doctrine of implied coercion.7
This case follows the general federal law in all particulars. It is good
that in its first decision on this point this court set a precedent which
more than likely will be easy to follow in the future." Apparently the
court felt that it should rely on the federal precedents now, rather than
having to rely on them at a later date.'
Matters relative to search and seizure used to be merely evidentiary
matters to be determined by the respective state courts. The decision
above seems to show that they are now being thought of as constitutional
issues and within the domain of federal jurisdiction.
R. H. Kraftson
Constitutional Law-Criminal Law-RIGHT TO COUNSEL. In Bid-
dle v. Commonwealth' Mrs. Biddle appealed her conviction for the
6. See Fitter v. United States, 258 Fed. 567 (1919).
Another case decided on the basis of coercion involved an agent, not the wife of de-
fendant, in re Tri-State Coal & Coke Co, 253 F. 605 (1918).
7. See People v. Lind, 370 I1. 131, 18 NE.2d 189 (1938); Meredith v. Commonwealth,
215 Ky. 705, 286 S.W. 1043 (1926); State v. Lindway, 131 Ohio St. 166, 2 N.E.2d 490
(1936); Byrd v. State, 161 Tenn. 306, 30 S.W.2d 273 (1930); State v. Bonolo, 39 Wvo.
299, 270 Pac. 1065 (1928).
8. It appears that the federal courts are fast taking on the responsibility of deciding
what is proper procedure in state criminal trials. Weeks v. United States, 232 US.
383 (1913), established the rule that any evidence seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is inadmissible in
a federal criminal trial. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) held that state law en-
forcement agencies must not violate this right, but left them free to introduce illegally
seized articles into evidence. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), applied the federal
exclusionary rule to the states in all cases of searches and seizures which violated the
Fourth Amendment.
9. The standard of determining what constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure
has been left to the states. Yet, here again we have indications that federal courts are
gradually extending their powers over state criminal law. Ker v. California, 374 U.S.
23 at 33-34 (1963), points the way by saying that the trial court's findings of reasonable-
ness will be "respected only insofar as consistent with federal constitutional guarantees.
As we have stated above and in other cases involving federal constitutional rights, find-
ings of state courts are by no means insulated against examination here.... The States
are not thereby precluded from developing workable rules governing arrests, searches
and seizures to meet 'the practical demands of effective criminal investigation and law
enforcement' in the States, provided that those rules do not violate the constitutional
proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures . . ." Thus future questions of
"reasonableness" before the Supreme Court will probably be determined on the basis
of federal law.
1. Biddle v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 14, 141 S.E.2d 710 (1965).
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